Should the organization, design and functioning of electricity markets be taken for granted? Definitely not. While decades of evolution of electricity markets in developed countries made us believe that we may have found the right and future-proof model, the substantially and rapidly evolving context of our power and energy systems is challenging this idea in many ways. Actually, that situation brings both challenges and opportunities. Challenges include accommodation of renewable energy generation, decentralization and support to investment, while opportunities are mainly that advances in technical and social sciences provide us with many more options in terms of future market design. We here take a holistic point of view, by trying to understand where we are coming from with electricity markets and where we may be going. Future electricity markets should be made fit for purpose by considering them as a way to organize and operate a socio-techno-economic system.

Permanently increasing penetration of converter-interfaced generation and renewable energy sources (RESs) makes modern electrical power systems more vulnerable to low probability and high impact events, such as extreme weather, which could lead to severe contingencies, even blackouts. These contingencies can be further propagated to neighbouring energy systems over coupling components/technologies and consequently negatively influence the entire multi-energy system (MES) (such as gas, heating and electricity) operation and its resilience. In recent years, machine learning-based techniques (MLBTs) have been intensively applied to solve various power system problems, including system planning, or security and reliability assessment. This paper aims to review MES resilience quantification methods and the application of MLBTs to assess the resilience level of future sustainable energy systems. The open research questions are identified and discussed, whereas the future research directions are identified.

We propose a new forward electricity market framework that admits heterogeneous market participants with second-order cone strategy sets, who accurately express the nonlinearities in their costs and constraints through conic bids, and a network operator facing conic operational constraints. In contrast to the prevalent linear-programming-based electricity markets, we highlight how the inclusion of second-order cone constraints improves uncertainty-, asset-, and network-awareness of the market, which is key to the successful transition towards an electricity system based on weather-dependent renewable energy sources. We analyze our general market-clearing proposal using conic duality theory to derive efficient spatially-differentiated prices for the multiple commodities, comprised of energy and flexibility services. Under the assumption of perfect competition, we prove the equivalence of the centrally-solved market-clearing optimization problem to a competitive spatial price equilibrium involving a set of rational and self-interested participants and a price setter. Finally, under common assumptions, we prove that moving towards conic markets does not incur the loss of desirable economic properties of markets, namely market efficiency, cost recovery, and revenue adequacy. Our numerical studies focus on the specific use case of uncertainty-aware market design and demonstrate that the proposed conic market brings advantages over existing alternatives within the linear programming market framework.

Renewable energy generation is offered through electricity markets, quite some time in advance. This then leads to a problem of decision-making under uncertainty, which may be seen as a newsvendor problem. Contrarily to the conventional case for which underage and overage penalties are known, such penalties in the case of electricity markets are unknown, and difficult to estimate. In addition, one is actually only penalized for either overage or underage, not both. Consequently, we look at a slightly different form of a newsvendor problem, for a price-taker participant offering in electricity markets, which we refer to as Bernoulli newsvendor problem. After showing that its solution is consistent with that for the classical newsvendor problem, we then introduce distributionally robust versions, with ambiguity possibly about both the probabilistic forecasts for power generation and the chance of success of the Bernoulli variable. Both versions of the distributionally robust Bernoulli newsvendor problem admit closed-form solutions. We finally use simulation studies, as well as a real-world case-study application, to illustrate the workings and benefits from the approach.

Distributed data refers to information that flows from different sources and possibly different owners. Getting top value from distributed data requires a paradigm shift towards collaborative forecasting. Alternative frameworks exist to support collaborative forecasting, from collaborative analytics to data markets, and from analytics markets to prediction markets. While we should accept that not all data will be openly shared, rethinking forecasting processes with modern communication, distributed computation, and a market component could yield substantial improvements in forecast quality while unleashing new business models

Energy forecasting has attracted enormous attention over the last few decades, with novel proposals related to the use of heterogeneous data sources, probabilistic forecasting, online learning, etc. A key aspect that emerged is that learning and forecasting may highly benefit from distributed data, though not only in the geographical sense. That is, various agents collect and own data that may be useful to others. In contrast to recent proposals that look into distributed and privacy-preserving learning (incentive-free), we explore here a framework called regression markets. There, agents aiming to improve their forecasts post a regression task, for which other agents may contribute by sharing their data for their features and get monetarily rewarded for it. The market design is for regression models that are linear in their parameters, and possibly separable, with estimation performed based on either batch or online learning. Both in-sample and out-of-sample aspects are considered, with markets for fitting models in-sample, and then for improving genuine forecasts out-of-sample. Such regression markets rely on recent concepts within interpretability of machine learning approaches and cooperative game theory, with Shapley additive explanations. Besides introducing the market design and proving its desirable properties, application results are shown based on simulation studies (to highlight the salient features of the proposal) and with real-world case studies.