Robust scheduling is an essential way to cope with uncertainty. However, the rising unpredictability in net demand of distributed prosumers and the lack of relevant data make it difficult for the operator to forecast the uncertainty well. This leads to inaccurate, or even infeasible, robust scheduling strategies. In this paper, a novel two-stage robust scheduling model is developed, which enables the operator to purchase predictive information from distributed prosumers to enhance scheduling efficiency. An improved uncertainty set with a smaller variation range is developed by combining the forecasts from the operator and prosumers. Since the improved uncertainty set is influenced by the first-stage information purchase related decisions, the proposed model eventually becomes a case of robust optimization with decision-dependent uncertainty (DDU). An adaptive column-and-constraint generation (C&CG) algorithm is developed to solve the problem within a finite number of iterations. The potential failures of traditional algorithms in detecting feasibility, guaranteeing convergence, and reaching optimal strategies under DDU are successfully circumvented by the proposed algorithm. Case studies demonstrate the effectiveness, necessity, and scalability of the proposed method.

Convex optimization finds many real-life applications, where – optimized on real data – optimization results may expose private data attributes (e.g., individual health records, commercial information, etc.), thus leading to privacy breaches. To avoid these breaches and formally guarantee privacy to optimization data owners, we develop a new privacy-preserving perturbation strategy for convex optimization programs by combining stochastic (chance-constrained) programming and differential privacy. Unlike standard noise-additive strategies, which perturb either optimization data or optimization results, we express the optimization variables as functions of the random perturbation using linear decision rules; we then optimize these rules to accommodate the perturbation within the problem’s feasible region by enforcing chance constraints. This way, the perturbation is feasible and makes different, yet adjacent in the sense of a given distance function, optimization datasets statistically similar in randomized optimization results, thereby enabling probabilistic differential privacy guarantees. The chance-constrained optimization additionally internalizes the conditional value-at-risk measure to model the tolerance towards the worst-case realizations of the optimality loss with respect to the non-private solution. We demonstrate the privacy properties of our perturbation strategy analytically and through optimization and machine learning applications.

We consider a new framework where a continuous, though bounded, random variable has unobserved bounds that vary over time. In the context of univariate time-series, we look at the bounds as parameters of the distribution of the bounded random variable. We introduce an extended log-likelihood estimation and design algorithms to track the bound through online maximum likelihood estimation. Since the resulting optimization problem is not convex, we make use of recent theoretical results on Normalized Gradient Descent (NGD) for quasi-convex optimization, to eventually derive an Online Normalized Gradient Descent algorithm. We illustrate and discuss the workings of our approach based on both simulation studies and a real-world wind power forecasting problem.

Energy market designs with non-merchant storage have been proposed in recent years, with the aim of achieving optimal integration of storage. In order to handle the time linking constraints that are introduced in such markets, existing works commonly make simplifying assumptions about the end-of-horizon storage level. This work analyses market properties under such assumptions, as well as in their absence. We find that, although they ensure cost recovery for all market participants, these assumptions generally lead to market inefficiencies. Therefore we consider the design of markets with non-merchant storage without such simplifying assumptions. Using an illustrative example, as well as detailed proofs, we provide conditions under which market prices in subsequent market horizons fail to reflect the value of stored energy. We show that this problem is essential to address in order to preserve market efficiency and cost recovery. Finally, we propose a method for restoring these market properties in a perfect-foresight setting.

In many areas of industry and society, e.g., energy, healthcare, logistics, agents collect vast amounts of data that they deem proprietary. These data owners extract predictive information of varying quality and relevance from data depending on quantity, inherent information content and their own technical expertise. Aggregating these data and heterogeneous predictive skills, which are distributed in terms of ownership, can result in a higher collective value for a prediction task. In this paper, we envision a platform for improving predictions via implicit pooling of private information in return for possible remuneration. Specifically, we design a wagering-based forecast elicitation market platform, where a buyer intending to improve their forecasts posts a prediction task, and sellers respond to it with their forecast reports and wagers. This market delivers an aggregated forecast to the buyer (pre event) and allocates a payoff to the sellers (post-event) for their contribution. We propose a payoff mechanism and prove that it satisfies several desirable economic properties, including those specific to electronic platforms. Furthermore, we discuss the properties of the forecast aggregation operator and scoring rules to emphasise their effect on the sellers’ payoff. Finally, we provide numerical examples to illustrate the structure and properties of the proposed market platform.