Despite recent advancements in machine learning, in practice, relevant datasets are often distributed among market competitors who are reluctant to share. To incentivize data sharing, recent works propose analytics markets, where multiple agents share features and are rewarded for improving the predictions of others. These rewards can be computed by treating features as players in a coalitional game, with solution concepts that yield desirable market properties. However, this setup incites agents to strategically replicate their data and act under multiple false identities to increase their own revenue and diminish that of others, limiting the viability of such markets in practice. In this work, we develop an analytics market robust to such strategic replication for supervised learning problems. We adopt Pearl’s do-calculus from causal inference to refine the coalitional game by differentiating between observational and interventional conditional probabilities. As a result, we derive rewards that are replication-robust by design.

Data markets facilitate decentralized data exchange for applications such as prediction, learning, or inference. The design of these markets is challenged by varying privacy preferences as well as data similarity among data owners. Related works have often overlooked how data similarity impacts pricing and data value through statistical information leakage. We demonstrate that data similarity and privacy preferences are integral to market design and propose a query-response protocol using local differential privacy for a two-party data acquisition mechanism. In our regression data market model, we analyze strategic interactions between privacy-aware owners and the learner as a Stackelberg game over the asked price and privacy factor. Finally, we numerically evaluate how data similarity affects market participation and traded data value.

The growing uncertainty from renewable power and electricity demand brings significant challenges to unit commitment (UC). While various advanced forecasting and optimization methods have been developed to predict better and address this uncertainty, most previous studies treat forecasting and optimization as separate tasks. This separation can lead to suboptimal results due to misalignment between the objectives of the two tasks. To overcome this challenge, we propose a robust UC framework that integrates the forecasting and optimization processes while ensuring statistical guarantees. In the forecasting stage, we combine multiple predictions derived from diverse data sources and methodologies for an improved prediction, aiming to optimize the UC performance. In the optimization stage, the combined prediction is used to construct an uncertainty set with statistical guarantees, based on which the robust UC model is formulated. The optimal robust UC solution provides feedback to refine the forecasting process, forming a closed loop. To solve the proposed integrated forecasting-optimization framework efficiently and effectively, we develop a neural network-based surrogate model for acceleration and introduce a reshaping method for the uncertainty set based on the optimization result to reduce conservativeness. Case studies on modified IEEE 30-bus and 118-bus systems demonstrate the advantages of the proposed approach.

Energy management costs can be reduced by increasing load forecasting accuracy. Many studies use multiple data sources to potentially yield improved forecasts. However, data owners may be hesitant to share their data due to privacy concerns and a lack of monetary incentives. Here, we establish a model trading market to encourage collaboration, in which a buyer can purchase advanced load forecasting models that have been trained by sellers’ data to facilitate his decision-making. Specifically, we first propose a cost-oriented loss function that links to the buyer’s decision-making problem, which serves as a basis for market participants to evaluate the model quality and design their utility functions. Then, an iterative model auction mechanism is proposed to orchestrate selfish market participants to reach a consensus on the social welfare-maximizing solution, where the model quality and price for trading are determined through a distributed process. Furthermore, we propose a model adaptation strategy, including model fine-tuning and ensembling, for the buyer to enhance the applicability of purchased models to his decision-making problem. Experiments for building energy management are conducted based on public datasets. Results show that our approach converges to the socially optimal point and every participant can benefit from the market: sellers are compensated for providing models; and, the buyer can greatly reduce operational costs by employing the purchased models.

Energy management costs can be reduced by increasing load forecasting accuracy. Many studies use multiple data sources to potentially yield improved forecasts. However, data owners may be hesitant to share their data due to privacy concerns and a lack of monetary incentives. Here, we establish a model trading market to encourage collaboration, in which a buyer can purchase advanced load forecasting models that have been trained by sellers’ data to facilitate his decision-making. Specifically, we first propose a cost-oriented loss function that links to the buyer’s decision-making problem, which serves as a basis for market participants to evaluate the model quality and design their utility functions. Then, an iterative model auction mechanism is proposed to orchestrate selfish market participants to reach a consensus on the social welfare-maximizing solution, where the model quality and price for trading are determined through a distributed process. Furthermore, we propose a model adaptation strategy, including model fine-tuning and ensembling, for the buyer to enhance the applicability of purchased models to his decision-making problem. Experiments for building energy management are conducted based on public datasets. Results show that our approach converges to the socially optimal point and every participant can benefit from the market: sellers are compensated for providing models; and, the buyer can greatly reduce operational costs by employing the purchased models.

This paper studies how to aggregate prosumers (or large consumers) and their collective decisions in electricity markets, with a focus on fairness. Fairness is essential for prosumers to participate in aggregation schemes. Some prosumers may not be able to access the energy market directly, even though it would be beneficial for them. Therefore, new companies offer to aggregate them and promise to treat them fairly. This leads to a fair resource allocation problem.

We propose to use acceptability constraints to guarantee that each prosumer gains from the aggregation.
Moreover, we aim to distribute the costs and benefits fairly, taking into account the multi-period and uncertain nature of the problem. Rather than using financial mechanisms to adjust for fairness issues, we focus on various objectives and constraints, within decision problems, that achieve fairness by design. We start from a simple single-period and deterministic model, and then generalize it to a dynamic and stochastic setting using, e.g., stochastic dominance constraints.

Energy market designs with non-merchant storage have been proposed in recent years, with the aim of achieving optimal integration of storage. In order to handle the time linking constraints that are introduced in such markets, existing works commonly make simplifying assumptions about the end-of-horizon storage level. This work analyses market properties under such assumptions, as well as in their absence. We find that, although they ensure cost recovery for all market participants, these assumptions generally lead to market inefficiencies. Therefore we consider the design of markets with non-merchant storage without such simplifying assumptions. Using an illustrative example, as well as detailed proofs, we provide conditions under which market prices in subsequent market horizons fail to reflect the value of stored energy. We show that this problem is essential to address in order to preserve market efficiency and cost recovery. Finally, we propose a method for restoring these market properties in a perfect-foresight setting.

Molslinjen, one of the world’s largest operators of fast-moving catamaran ferries, based in Denmark, adopted a focus on digitalization to profoundly change its operations and business practices. Molslinjen partnered with Halfspace, a data, analytics and AI company based in Copenhagen, Denmark, to support that transition. Halfspace and Molslinjen jointly developed and deployed a successful forecasting and revenue management toolbox for the data-driven operation of ferries in Denmark since 2020. This has resulted in $2.6-3.2 million yearly savings (and a total of $5 million savings as of December 2023), a significant reduction in the number of delayed departures and average delays, and a 3% reduction in fuel costs and emissions. This toolbox relies on some of the latest advances in machine learning for forecasting and in analytics approaches to revenue management. The potential for generalizing our toolbox to the global ferry industry is significant, with an impact on both revenues and environmental, societal, and governance criteria.